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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN KOCHER,
Petitioner-Appellant,

Case No. 940141-CA

v.
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS and
SCOTT CARVER, Warden,
Respondents-Appellees.

#

Priority No. 3

:
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner, a now-paroled third degree felon, appeals from the
district court's dismissal of his pro se petition for extraordinary
relief from respondent Utah Board of Pardons' rescission of his
parole date.

The petition was brought under Rule 65B(c) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on grounds that respondents had
wrongfully

restrained

petitioner's personal

liberty, but was

decided under subsection (e) of the rule as a claim of wrongful use
of judicial authority. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (h) (Supp. 1994)
grants

this

Court

jurisdiction

over

appeals

from

petitions

challenging Board decisions that do not involve a first degree or
capitol felony.

ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
!•

Did the district court correctly consider the petition

under Rule 65B(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
In reviewing dismissal of a petition for extraordinary relief,
an appellate court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law

without deference for correctness.

Rawlinas v. Holden. 869 P.2d

958, 960 (Utah App. 1994); accord. Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons,
839 P.2d 874# 876 (Utah App. 1992).
2.
of

Did the district court err in determining that the Board

Pardons

regularly

pursued

its

authority

in

rescinding

petitioner's parole date?
On appeal from the dismissal of a petition for extraordinary
relief, the reviewing court surveys the record in the light most
favorable to the findings and judgment and will not reverse if the
record provides a reasonable basis to support the trial court's
decision.

Northern v. Barnes. 870 P.2d 914 (Utah 1993); accord.

Padilla. 839 P.2d at 876; Hall v. Utah Bd. of Pardons. 806 P.2d
217# 217 (Utah App. 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues before the Court is
contained in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order entered by the trial court on

February 8, 1994 (Addendum A, R. 57-59), dismissing petitioner's
claim

that

respondents

violated

his

due

process

rights

in

rescinding his parole date. The trial court held that the claims
were properly cognizable not under Rule 65B(b) or (c) of the Utah
2

Rules of Civil Procedure, but under subsection (e) of the rule.
See Addendum A at R. 57-58.

Finding that petitioner did not show

any actions in which respondents failed to follow applicable law,
exceeded their authority, or abused their discretion, the court
denied the relief requested by petitioner and granted respondents'
motion to dismiss the petition.
B.

See id. at R. 58.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
On October 12, 1993, petitioner

extraordinary

relief

in

the Third

filed his petition for

District

Court

(R. 2-7) .

Alleging jurisdiction under Rule 65B(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioner claimed that respondents had violated his due
process rights by rescinding his parole date based on a flawed
prison disciplinary action.

Although the petition states that

petitioner attached supporting affidavits, records, and other
evidence (see R. 5 at 1 7) , the sole attachment to the petition
contained in the court's record is petitioner's own affidavit
simply repeating the general allegations of the petition (R. 7).
Two days later, the district court judge ruled that the petition
was not frivolous and ordered respondents to answer pursuant to
Rule 65B(c)(5).

R. 9-11.

On October 29, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
petition and a supporting memorandum.

R. 14-35.

In support of

their motion, respondents argued that the petition failed to state
a

claim of unlawful

restraint

cognizable under Rule 65B(c).

Petitioner responded by moving to strike the motion to dismiss and
requesting a hearing.

R. 38-46.

3

A hearing was held on December 12, 1993, and respondents'
motion to dismiss was granted. R. 56. On March 2, 1994, following
the trial court's February 8, 1994 order of dismissal (Addendum A,
R. 57-59) , attorney David S. Steed entered an appearance of counsel
on petitioner's behalf (R. 60-61) and filed a notice of appeal (R.
62-63).
C.

Statement of Relevant Facts
At the time the petition was filed, petitioner, a convicted

felon, was confined to the Utah State Prison on third degree felony
convictions of theft and auto theft
revocation of a prior parole

(R. 24 and 27) following

(R. 32) .

At the time of his

revocation hearing, petitioner was given a new parole date of
August 24, 1993. R. 32. However, on June 16, 1993, the Board of
Pardons advised petitioner by letter that it had received a
rescission
actions.

request

based

on

Addendum B, R. 45.

unspecified

prison

disciplinary

The letter requested petitioner to

prepare to appear for a rescission hearing at the prison before a
Board staff member on June 30, 1993, at 10:00 a.m. The letter also
enumerated six categories of information contained in petitioner's
Board file that could be considered, and noted that "[a]ny other
specific items of information to be considered by the Board will be
identified for you at the hearing and you will have an opportunity
to respond at that time."

Id. at R. 45.

At the June 30, 1993 hearing, the Board entered an interim
order rescinding the August parole date and granting a new date of
December 14, 1993. Addendum C at R. 29. Although the Board noted
4

employment

possibilities,

a

meaningful

support

system,

and

acceptance of responsibility for some conduct as positive factors,
it determined the rescission to be appropriate based on aggravating
circumstances including denial or minimization of responsibility
for other conduct; repeated, numerous incarcerations or parole
revocation;

a

lack

of

participation

in

appropriate

prison

programming; and prison disciplinary problems or other defiance of
authority. Addendum C at R. 30. The interim decision was affirmed
on July 13, 1993. Addendum D, R. 26-27.
On October 12, 1993, petitioner filed his petition for writ of
habeas corpus and postconviction relief in the Third District Court
(R. 2-7), claiming that respondents had violated his due process
rights by relying on false information in rescinding his parole
date (R. 4).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondents do not disagree with petitioner's premise that
petitions for extraordinary relief are available to seek review of
certain actions of the Board of Pardons.

They do, however,

disagree with petitioner's understanding of the nature and scope of
that review.

As held by the court below and not contested here,

the claims made by petitioner are properly characterized as claims
that the Board of Pardons, an administrative agency, wrongfully
used its judicial authority by exceeding its jurisdiction, abusing
its discretion, or failing to act in accordance with applicable law
pursuant to Rule 65B(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

5

Under subsection (e)(4), the district court's role can extend no
further than assuring that the Board, in its actions, regularly
pursued its authority. The fact that petitioner disagrees with the
outcome of his rescission hearing is insufficient to show legal
error on the Board's part.
Petitioner's reliance on the alleged mishandling of his prison
disciplinary action is misplaced.

By his own admission, he

explained his concerns to the Board.

By providing petitioner the

opportunity

to

rebut

claimed

errors

in

the

disciplinary

proceedings, the Board provided him appropriate due process.
Having entertained his explanation, the Board was entitled to weigh
it against other considerations in determining that rescission was
nonetheless warranted.
The court found that petitioner did not establish facts
showing either an abuse of the Board's discretion or a failure by
respondents to follow statutes, rules, or regulations governing
their actions. Petitioner has not marshalled the evidence in favor
of

the

court's

findings

as

precedent

requires.

Moreover,

petitioner's failure to provide a transcript of the district court
hearing, as required by rule when findings or conclusions are
challenged, precludes a showing that the findings lack a sufficient
evidentiary basis.

In light of these deficiencies, the findings

must be accepted as valid, and review is limited to a determination
of whether the court's legal conclusions are consistent with those
findings. Since the facts as found by the court show no instances
of violative conduct by respondents, the court's conclusion that

6

respondents regularly pursued their authority is inescapable.
Petitioner has not shown that the Board of Pardons violated
his due process rights in any way.

Because the Board regularly

pursued its authority in rescinding his parole date, he is not
entitled to relief, and the district court's dismissal of his
petition must be affirmed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY1 CONSIDERED THE
PETITION UNDER RULE 65B(e) OB THE UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Petitioner acknowledges and does not contest the propriety of
the

district

court's

ruling

that

petitioner's

claims

are

appropriately actionable under subsection (e) of Rule 65B of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Nonetheless, his arguments

See Brief of Appellant at 6, 1 o.

cm appeal do not

address whether

respondents regularly pursued their authority in rescinding his
parole date. Instead, petitioner argues that the substance of the
Board's decision is wrong because of underlying flaws in a prison
disciplinary action considered by the Board in its decisionmaking
process.

In effect, petitioner seeks this Court's review of the

merits of the Board's determination, a result precluded not only by
statute but by binding precedent.
As worded at the time of the district court's order of
dismissal, Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (Supp. 1993) stated that
n

[d]ecisions of the Board of Pardons in cases involving paroles,
7

pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution, or
remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are not subject to
judicial review."1

As petitioner correctly points out, Foote v.

Utah Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), established that
despite this provision, review of Board actions is available in
certain circumstances.

However, as settled by binding authority,

the scope of that review is limited to an examination of procedural
due process pursuant to Rule 65B(e).
In Lancaster v. Utah Board of Pardons. 869 P.2d 945 (Utah
1994), the supreme court established both the rationale for the
application of subsection (e) and the parameters of a subsection
(e) review.

Lancaster sought relief against the Board for, among

other things, failing to fix a definite release date. The petition
alleged jurisdiction under both subsections (c) and (e) of Rule
65B. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of th6
petition as frivolous.

The court rejected

consideration of

Lancaster's claims under subsection (c), holding that,
[a]s explained in Labrum, we must review
the fairness of the process by which the Board
undertakes its sentencing function, but we do
not sit as a panel of review on the result,
absent some other constitutional claim, such
as cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly,
Lancaster's claim under Rule 65B(c) was
properly dismissed as frivolous on its face.
Lancaster.

869

P. 2d

at

947

(citation omitted)

(emphasis

in

original).

Scrutinizing the claims under Rule 65B(e), the court

Effective May 2, 1994, the provision was amended to add the
words "and Parole" after "Board of Pardons", but the substance of
the provision remained unchanged.

8

determined that the dismissal was warranted by Lancaster's failure
to allege "facts showing that the Board failed to act as required
by law, exceeded its jurisdiction, abused its discretion, or
refused him a right to which he was entitled."

Id. at 948.

The application of subsection (e) to claims against the Board
was most recently upheld in Preece v. House, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 10
(Utah November 23, 1994). Preece challenged his Board-established
parole date on several grounds, including the Board's alleged
consideration of a prison disciplinary report that was supposed to
have been expunged from his file. The supreme court found Preece's
petition appropriate under subsection (e), see Preece. 252 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 12, and relied on Lancaster to reject review of the
Board's substantive decision.

See id.

As in Preece and Lancaster, petitioner is entitled to a review
of the procedure by which the Board reached its decision regarding
his parole date. Likewise, as in these controlling precedents, he
is entitled to no more. Statute and case law mandate affirmance of
the court's application of Rule 65B(e) to petitioner's case.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO ADDUCE FACTS SHOWING THAT
RESPONDENTS ACTED IN VIOLATION OF LAW,
EXCEEDED THEIR JURISDICTION, ABUSED THEIR
DISCRETION, OR DENIED A RIGHT TO WHICH
PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED.
To succeed in his Rule 65B(e) claim, petitioner can obtain
relief only on the following grounds:
(A) where an inferior court, administrative
agency,
or officer
exercising
judicial
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or

9

abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior
court, administrative agency, corporation or
person has failed to perform an act required
by law as a duty of office, trust or station;
or (C) where an inferior court, administrative
agency, corporation or person has refused the
petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or
office to which petitioner is entitled.
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(e)(2).
the

record

demonstrating

sustains,
that

As the court below properly found and

petitioner

respondents

did

committed

not
any

adduce

evidence

such violation.

Petitioner argues extensively in his brief that the Board's
rescission action is defective because the record before the Board
included

an allegedly

flawed prison disciplinary

Petitioner's attack is misguided.

proceeding.

Any error committed by prison

authorities in the disciplinary proceeding is simply irrelevant to
the issue of whether the Board violated petitioner's rights and
goes to the merits of the Board's parole determination, a function
"certainly well within the Board's discretion."
P.2d at 947.

Lancaster. 869

Indeed, as the -supreme court noted in Preece. 252

Utah Adv. Rep. at 12, "so long as the period of incarceration
decided upon by the board of pardons falls within an inmate's
applicable indeterminate range, e.g., five years to life, then that
decision, absent unusual circumstances, cannot be arbitrary and
capricious."

Petitioner has shown no unusual circumstances here.

Even assuming, solely for the purpose of argument, that the
prison's disciplinary action were flawed as petitioner contends,
petitioner has shown no impropriety by respondents that would
entitle him to relief against them.

Petitioner has made no claim

that the Board used constitutionally defective procedures in its
10

decisionmaking process. He has not alleged that the Board provided
inadequate notice of his rescission hearing.

He has not claimed

that the Board, in contemplating the rescission request, failed to
advise him of the evidence that could be considered, prevented him
from raising or responding to relevant issues, or denied any
request for additional information.

He has not asserted that the

Board declined to provide an adequate written rationale for its
rescission of his parole date. His sole claim against respondents
is a challenge to the substance of the decision rescinding his
parole date, not to the procedure by which that decision was
reached.

Although he complains that prison officials not made

parties to this suit violated his rights in disciplining him for an
infraction of prison rules, he does not claim that the respondents
he

has

brought

under

the

Court's

jurisdiction

bear

any

responsibility for those alleged violations.
Petitioner mischaracterizes the Board's rescission of his
parole date as resulting from an "automatic recision provision.11
See Brief of Appellant at 1.

In contrast, the record reveals a

course of deliberation that was anything but automatic.

After

receiving a rescission request based on multiple disciplinaries,
the Board scheduled and advised petitioner of a hearing "to discuss
this matter."

Addendum

explanation

the

to

B,

Board,

R.

45.

Following

an

interim

decision

petitioner's
rescinding

petitioner's parole date was entered on June 30, 1993 (Addendum C
at R. 29), and a written rationale was provided (id. at R. 30) .
The interim decision was reviewed and affirmed by the Board on July
11

13,

1993

entered

(Addendum D at R. 2 6 ) , and a new order of parole
(id.

at

R.

27) .

Far

from

the

automatic

process

petitioner suggests, the Board's action represents an

was
that

individual

determination in which petitioner was afforded a full opportunity
to air his concerns in accordance with due process.
The record before the Board included much more than a single
prison disciplinary proceeding.

As enumerated in the June 16, 1993

letter advising petitioner of his rescission hearing, petitioner's
complete

Board

file

was

open

for

the

Board's

consideration,

including
(1)
Public
information,
including
judgment and commitment orders, prior
Board dispositions, parole agreements,
and the like;
(2) Information generated
from Adult
Probation
and
Parole,
including
presentence and postsentence
reports,
probation
violation
reports,
parole
progress
and
violation
reports,
diagnostic reports, and so forth;
(3) Prison information, including board
reports, disciplinaries. progress
and
rescission reports, psychologicals, etc.;
(4) Information generated internally for
the
Board,
including
worksheets,
routings, guideline matrices, alienist
reports, warrant requests;
(5) Other criminal justice information,
including
police
and
prosecutorial
reports, recommendations from sentencing
judges, criminal record data, other court
documents;
(6) Other correspondence sent to the
Board concerning you.
Any other specific items of information to be
considered by the Board will be identified for
you at the hearing and you will have an
opportunity to respond at that time.
Addendum B, R. 45
Because

(emphasis supplied).

petitioner

attacks
12

the

court's

finding

that

respondents engaged in no conduct violative of his rights, he is
obligated

to marshal the evidence in support of the court's

finding.

The Supreme Court of Utah has outlined an appellant's

burden:
An appellate court does not lightly disturb
the verdict of a jury nor the findings of fact
made by a trial court. If a challenge is made
to the findings, an appellant must marshall
all evidence in favor of the facts as found by
the trial court and then demonstrate that even
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the court below,
the evidence is
insufficient to support the finding of fact.
If the appellant fails to marshal the
evidence, the appellate court assumes that the
record supports the findings of the trial
court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy
of the lower court's conclusions of law and
the application of that law to the case.
Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991).

As this Court

has elaborated, " [sluccessful challenges to findings of fact thus
must demonstrate to appellate courts first how the trial court
found the facts from the evidence and second why such findings
contradict the weight of the evidence." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold
Storage and Warehouse. 872 P.2d 1051, 1053

(Utah App. 1994) .

Petitioner here has taken neither step.
Petitioner does not claim that he was unable to raise his
concerns about the disciplinary action against him to the Board.
By petitioner's own admission, he explained to the Board the errors
he perceived in the disciplinary action on which his petition
focuses.

See R. 48.

However, the Board's written rationale for

its decision shows that on balance, the Board considered the
aggravating

circumstances

of

denial
13

and

minimization

of

responsibility, petitioner's incarceration and revocation history
(see R. 32), his programming record, and his prison disciplinary
problems to favor delay of his parole by less than four months.
See Addendum C at R. 30.
unaddressed

this

record

exercise of discretion.

On appeal, petitioner leaves wholly
evidence

of

respondents' appropriate

He shows neither how the court used the

evidence before it to find respondents in compliance with their
legal duty, nor why the weight of the evidence requires a different
result.

Petitioner's failure to meet his burden of marshalling

mandates affirmance of the court's findings:

respondents did not

fail to follow governing statutes, rules, or regulations,

did not

exceed their authority, and did not abuse their discretion.

See

Addendum A at R. 58, 1 3.
Under Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
"[i]f the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence
relevant to such finding or conclusion."

Where an appellant does

not provide a transcript in accordance with the rule, a reviewing
court is incapable of assessing the correctness of the findings,
and is limited to "reviewfing] the court's legal conclusions for
consistency

with

the

findings,

giving

them

no

deference."

Prudential Capital Group Co. v. Mattson. 802 P.2d 104, 106 (Utah
App.

1990).

Petitioner

has

provided

no

transcript

here.

Therefore, he can succeed on appeal only if the lower court's
conclusion is inconsistent with the facts as it found them.
14

As previously discussed, the court found no evidence showing
actions by respondents that were in excess of their jurisdiction,
abusive of their discretion, or noncompliant with governing law,
and petitioner has not marshalled the evidence to show these
findings in error. Petitioner's failure of proof cannot be used to
thrust his burden upon respondents.
respondents

regularly

pursued

The court's conclusion that

their

authority

consistent with the facts as the court

is

entirely

found them, and its

consequent dismissal of the petition is unassailable.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, respondents respectfully
request the Court to affirm the district court's dismissal of the
petition in this case.
Dated this

day of December, 1994.

^? uC.
v

- Nancyl L. Kemp
Assistant Attorney General
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copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES to the following:
David S. Steed, Attorney
Hilton Sc Steed, P.CProvo Office
P. 0. Box 50371
Provo, Utah 84605-0371

ADDENDUM A

:LaKe County, Utaft

LORENZO K. MILLER (5761)
Attorneys for Respondents
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
Assistant Attorney General
330 South 300 East, Second Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1600
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN KOCHER,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Petitioner,

v.
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS,
et al.,

Judge Anne M. Stirba

Respondents.

Case No. 930905892 HC

The above-entitled matter came before this Court on December
10,

1993, for Respondents' Motion to Dismiss.

The Respondents

present being represented by Lorenzo K. Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, and Petitioner was also present.

The Court hereby FINDS

AND CONCLUDES:
1.

For the reasons stated in Respondents' Motion to Dismiss,

Petitioner's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is improperly
asserted as a Rule 65B(b) or (c) action.
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2.

Petitioner's claims are properly characterized as Rule

65B(e) claims.
3.
that

the

There is no record before the Court which demonstrates
Respondents

failed

to

follow

statutes,

rules

or

regulations governing their actions, exceeded their authority or
abused their discretion Respondents.
Having made the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, the Court
orders the following:
1.

Respondents' motion to dismiss is granted.

2.

The relief Petitioner seeks is denied.

3.

The case is hereby dismissed.

DATED this ffi^- day of February, 1994,
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE ANNE
Third District

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing order of dismissal was mailed, postage prepaid, to David
S. Steed, 203 South 1920 West, Provo, UT 84601, this
February, 1994.

/

day of

ADDENDUM B

State of Utah
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE
Michael O. Leavitt
Governor
Michael R. Sibbett
Chairman
Donald E. Blanchard
HJL (Pete) Haun
Curtis L. Garner
Cheryl Hansen
Members

448 East 6400 South - Suite 300
Murray, Utah 84107
Tel (801) 261-6464

Fax (801) 261*481

June 16,1993

John Kocher, USP# 19261
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Dear Mr. Kocher:
This is to notify you that a Rescission Request has been received at the Board that
indicates you have disciplinaries. This may effect your current status. Therefore,
please be prepared to appear before a Board of Pardons Staff Member on June 30,
1993 at 10:00 am at the Utah State Prison Main Facility; Draper, Utah in a Rescission
Hearing to discuss this matter.
In connection with your upcoming hearing, everything in your Board file may be
considered. Like other offenders' files, your file contains its own variation of the
following categories of information:
(1) Public information, including judgment and commitment orders, prior Board
dispositions, parole agreements, and the like;
(2) Information generated from Adult Probation and Parole, including presentence
and postsentence reports, probation violation reports, parole progress and
violation reports, diagnostic reports, and so forth;
(3) Prison information, including board reports, disciplinaries, progress and
rescission reports, psychological, etc.;
(4) Information generated internally for the Board, including worksheets, routings,
guideline matrices, alienist reports, warrant requests;
(5) Other criminal justice information, including police and prosecutorial reports,
recommendations from sentencing judges, criminal record data, other court
documents;
(6) Other correspondence sent to the Board concerning you.
Any other specific Items of information to be considered by the Board will be identified
for you at the hearing and you will have an opportunity to respond at that time.
If you have further questions, please ask your caseworker.
Sincerely,
M.R. SIBBETT, CHAIRPERSON
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS
Enid O. Pino, Hearing Officer
Utah State Board of Pardons
cc: USP Records
File
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ADDENDUM C

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
The status of KOCHER, JOHN RICHARD
, USP No.
19261 , OBSCIS No.
50755
came before the Utah State Board of Pardons on the 30th day of June, 1993,
for the following consideration:
RESCISSION HEARING
CRIME OF COMMITMENT
~I
AUTO THEFT
3
THEFT

COURT CASE #
5 6202
5 921900119

JUDGE
PAGE
HYDE

EXPIRATION
01/28/1994
02/10/1997

ORDER
After the statement of \Jdr\Y\ KltnAWJ

hOdnCK and the following witnesses,

1)
2)
,
and for good cause appearing, the Board of Pardons made the following decision:
Rescind

of

___ Begin parole on

i.

&jtfd>
ffi///j

T.S.P.

parole date,
y3

with the following special conditions:

«. HeMMlSh 6&-IJ tfc

*tffj

Amend parole agreement to add/delete/modify the conditions described above
___ Terminate sentence (including parole supervision) on
Expiration of sentence to be effective on
Schedule rehearing for
Other:

The reasons for this decision are.identified on the attached page.
At the discretion of the Board of Pardons, this decision Is subject to review
and modification at any time prior to actual release from custody.
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Dtahf I affix my signature on
behalf of the Chairperson of the Board this 30th day of June, 1993.
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RATIONALE FOR DECISION ON

Jfi^n. /C*t4tA
Naffie
/&&/

"

wSSh,

u%<**>#
( K l )v

HEARING DATE:

^A^A3

HEARING TYPE;

^kfiUaiA*.

—

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
The Board of Pardons1 decision is based on the following factors:
AGGRAVATING
MITIGATING
OFFENDER'S BACKGROUND
Criminal history significantly underrepresented by guidelines
(i.e., more than 4 felony convictions and/or 6 misdemeanors)
History of similar offenses
Pattern of increasingly or decreasingly serious offenses . • .
_____ History of unsuccessful or successful supervisions . . . . . .
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE
Use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities
Demonstration of extreme cruelty or depravity
Abuse of position of trust, special skill, or responsibility
Multiple incidents and/or victims
^m^^_^ Personal gain reaped from the offense . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OFFENDER'S TRAITS DURING THE OFFENSE
Motive (intentional, premeditated vs. impulsive, reactionary) .
Role (organizer, leader vs. follower, minimal participant) • .
Obstruction of justice vs. early withdrawal or self-surrender .
VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS
Extent of injury (physical, emotional, financial, social)
Relatively vulnerable victim vs. aggressive or provoking victim
Victim in position of authority over offender

if
^
/
if

PRESEN CHARACTERISTICS
OFFENDERS PRESENT
Denial or minimization vs. complete acceptance of responsibility Ir
Repeated, numerous vs. first incarceration or parole revocation
Extent of remorse a"n3 apparent motivation to rehabilitate . • .
Timeliness and extent of efforts to pay restitution • • . . . .
Prison programming (effort to enroll, nature of programming) •
Prison disciplinary
problems
or other
defiance
of authority
Employment
possibilities
(history,
skills,
current
job, future) t^^
Extent of community fear, condemnation • • • • • • • • • • • •
Degree of meaningful support system . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V^
Nature and stability of release plans . m . . . . . . . . . . .
_____
Unusual institutional vulnerability (due to age, health, other)
Overall rehabilitative progress and promise • • • • • • . • • •

Lengthy history of alcohol/drug abuse vs. apparent rehabilitation
Substantial continuous period in custody on other charges . • •
Likely release to detainer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
QTHKft

ADDENDUM D

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH STATE OBSCIS NO.
Consideration of the Status of KOCHER, JOHN RICHARD

50755

PRISON NO*

19261

The above-entitled matter came on for consideration before the Utah State Board
of Pardons on the 13th day of July, 1993, for:

RESCISSION HEARING
After a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board
makes the following decision and order:

RESULTS
Rescind 08/24/1993 parole. Parole
effective 12/14/1993. Interim decision of
06/30/93 affirmed.

1
2
3
4

Successfully complete ISP Program.
Not consume or possess any alcohol.
Pay restitution of $4308.00 - CASE// 6202.
Pay restitution x>f $624.96 - CASE# 0119.

No Crime
1
AUTO THEFT
3
THEFT

Sent Case No.
5 6202
5 921900119

Judge
PAGE
HYDE

Expiration
01/28/1994
02/10/1997

This decision Is subject to review and modification by the Board of Pardons at
any time until actual release from custody*
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date
13th day of Julyf 1993, affixed my signature as Chairman for and
on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons.
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•liehSTI.'bb.tt
IhchMl R. Slbbttt
Ch ,rm n
» »

fr/.V^/^
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Don..dE.B..neh.rd
H.L. (Ptle) H«un
Curtis L.G.rn«r
Cheryl Hansen

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTAH STATE OBSCIS NO. 00050755
UTAH STATE PRISON NO. 19261
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF KOCHER, JOHN RICHARD

This matter of application for parole, termination of sentence, or
expiration of sentence having come before the Utah State Board of Pardons
in a regularly scheduled hearing on the 13th day of July, 1993, and the
applicant appearing in person or having waived in writing the right to
appearance 8nd the Board having heard the case, issues the following order:
It is hereby ordered that K0CHER, JOHN RICHARD be paroled from the
unishment and sentence heretofore imposed upon him/her by a judge of the
econd District Court in and for the county of Davis, Weber for the crime(s)
of AUTO THEFT, 3rd degree felony, Expiration 01/28/94; AUTO THEFT, class A
misdemeanor. Expiration 04/22/90; THEFT, 3rd degree felony, Expiration
02/10/97.

f

The paroletfhallnot become effective until 14th dav of December. 1993.
The applicant agrees to the conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by
signing the parole agreement. The parole agreement or contract shall be
administered by duly authorized agents of the Utah State Department of
Corrections for the Utah State Board of Pardons.
It is further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant
shall be guilty of any infractions of the rules and regulations of the Utah
State Prison or $hall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned by the Utah
State Prison or is found to be in violation of any other law of the State of
Utah prior to the effective d$te of said parole, then this Order of Parole is
revoked and becomes null and void.
Dated this 13th day of July, 1993.
By Order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this
15th day of July# 1993, reduced its decision in this matter to writing and
hereby affix my signature as Chairman for and on behalf of the State of
Utah, Board of Pardons.

tt.R./Sibb^tt,

Cheirroa
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